Michael Osfeld

Presentation Title

Adaptationism transforms the problem of free will  

Abstract

Dating over 2000 years old, the debate surrounding the problem of free will continues to unfold. Despite philosophical and psychological interest in the problem, two important meta-questions remain overlooked: 1) what do humans really mean when they talk about free will, and 2) why are humans worried about not having free will in the first place? These questions are explored in three studies based on predictions from the efficacy of intentional intervention (Eii) theory of free will. Eii theory stipulates that “free will” is an evolved psychological representation for the efficacy an intentional intervention may have in changing the planning or goal states of an agent. Therefore, study 1 and 2 examine the prediction that judgments of free will and judgments of Eii will track one another through different contexts. A further prediction is that concerns about determinism and the absence of free will are purely the result of concerns for manipulation, coercion, or constraint. Study 3 tests this prediction by placing participants in a scenario with added causal determinism and varying whether that determinism could be used by them or against them.